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Kokkonen, A and Vaagaasar, A L (2018) Managing collaborative space in multi-partner projects. Construction Management and Economics, 36(02), 83-95.

Loosemore, M and Lim, B T H (2018) Mapping corporate social responsibility strategies in the construction and engineering industry. Construction Management and Economics, 36(02), 67-82.

Odoemena, A T and Horita, M (2018) A strategic analysis of contract termination in public-private partnerships: Implications from cases in Sub-Saharan Africa. Construction Management and Economics, 36(02), 96-108.

  • Type: Journal Article
  • Keywords: holdup; underinvestment; rough sets; contract termination; public-private partnerships; explanatory power; partnerships; public private partnerships; empirical analysis; contracts
  • ISBN/ISSN: 0144-6193
  • URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2017.1361039
  • Abstract:
    The paper examines empirically what contributes to the problem of contract termination in public-private partnerships (PPPs) from the perspectives of theories on contracts, transaction costs and industrial organizations. Based on a theoretical exploration of a model of the holdup and underinvestment problems, we identified the profit-sharing mechanism as the contract type that most predisposes a PPP to the inefficiencies that lead to contract termination. We then conducted an empirical examination of a data-set of PPP contracts in sub-Saharan Africa. Using rough sets theory and the logic of explanatory power, we found that contract type outweighs other factors, such as sector and nationality, in the explanation of contract termination.;The paper examines empirically what contributes to the problem of contract termination in public-private partnerships (PPPs) from the perspectives of theories on contracts, transaction costs and industrial organizations. Based on a theoretical exploration of a model of the holdup and underinvestment problems, we identified the profit-sharing mechanism as the contract type that most predisposes a PPP to the inefficiencies that lead to contract termination. We then conducted an empirical examination of a data-set of PPP contracts in sub-Saharan Africa. Using rough sets theory and the logic of explanatory power, we found that contract type outweighs other factors, such as sector and nationality, in the explanation of contract termination.;

Olivieri, H, Seppänen, O and Denis Granja, A (2018) Improving workflow and resource usage in construction schedules through location-based management system. Construction Management and Economics, 36(02), 109-24.